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Abstract: This paper applies and develops Marx’s concept of the fetish generally and 
technological fetishism specifically to how digital ICTs are influencing the craft of 
journalism. Although largely theoretical, its analysis of technological fetishism is 
applied to the findings of a survey conducted in 2013 among Canadian journalistic 
workers. The paper finds that these workers hold mixed and often contradictory views 
on how digital technologies are shaping their work and profession. By understanding 
ICTs to be both constitutive of journalism and, more precisely, the technological fetish 
as a mediating force in its development, the paper argues that the survey respondents 
are not ‘wrong’ to recognize that digital technologies seem to possess inherent 
powers. Because the fetishization of digital technologies is rooted in the relational 
conditions of contemporary journalism and neoliberal capitalism, redressing these – 
rather than just efforts to think reflexively about them – is what needs to be 
strategically prioritized. Indeed, both critical thought, using the concept of 
technological fetishism, and political action are needed if the insecurities and 
deleterious transformations taking place in journalism are to be modified and the 
democratizing potentials of digital ICTs fully realized.  
Keywords: political economy, technological fetishism, digital labour, ideology, 
journalism 
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Introduction 
Over the last two decades, digital technologies have been used in ways that have 
transformed the craft and business of journalism. As with other media activities, the 
future of print, broadcast and, indeed, online journalism is an open question. While 
the development and use of such technologies are implicated in the restructuring of 
news organizations and the search for new business models and revenue streams, they 
are also playing a constitutive role in how journalists understand their work and 
journalism itself. 
 This paper, drawing on the findings of a national survey of over three hundred 
Canadian journalists conducted online in 2013, examines the constitutive implications 
of digital information and communications technologies (ICTs) in the thinking and 
political capacities of journalistic workers. To do this, in conjunction with its 
empirical findings, we apply the concept of technological fetishism arguing that the 
precarious conditions experienced by journalists are being both understood and 
occluded through the fetish. 
 The survey demonstrates an array of perspectives concerning the state of the 
craft/profession – some extremely concerned, others remarkably celebratory, but 
almost all expressing the view that new technologies are inherently powerful forces. 
To comprehend these views, we reference hundreds of written comments provided by 
respondents and interpret them using the fetish and other useful concepts. We argue 
that different journalists in different positions of security or precariousness, 
organization or atomization, and degrees of what we call 'engulfment' [1], appear to 
have different conceptual capacities, all of which are being mediated through the 
fetish.  
In what follows we present the survey's more germane findings. We then 
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explain the concept of the fetish generally and technological fetishism specifically, 
followed by a more nuanced and, in places, speculative analysis of both the survey's 
results and the political implications of technological fetishism for journalism and 
journalistic workers going forward. 
 
The Survey 
From September 4 to October 14, 2013, an online survey of 343 Canadian journalists 
was conducted on their use of digital technologies. Answering its 50 questions were 
self-selected journalists who either received an email invitation or responded to 
notices posted on public listservs (the survey also was publicized by the Canadian 
Media Guild). [2] Among the respondents, “reporter” is most commonly used as a 
means of primary self-identification (12.3%), followed by “editor” (10.7%), and then 
“writer” (8.3%). Among the many who identify themselves with several jobs 
(constituting 33.7% of all participants), many respondents call themselves “writers” 
(46.4%) while almost half (48.2%) use the term “freelancer.”  
 In reporting how they are paid, only 57.9% say they receive a salary while 
two-thirds (66.4%) report their employment incomes to be insufficient. Predictably, a 
positive relationship was found to exist between those who are not paid a salary and 
respondents reporting a sense professional insecurity (significant at the .001 level). 
Respondents paid for their work on a per-piece basis or paid by the word conveyed 
more insecurity than others. Almost half of the survey's respondents (47.7%) state that 
their incomes are “less than adequate” to cover their living expenses (in fact, 74.5% 
indicated some form of dependency on non-employment income). [3] 
 According to the survey, the wages and salaries needed to pay journalists to 
practice their craft and sustain them as professionals appears to be in a state of crisis. 
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A remarkable 42.2% do not foresee themselves working in journalism after the year 
2022 and those who are pessimistic about their future outnumber those who were 
optimistic (51.5% vs. 43.6%). Yet, when asked questions about their current jobs, just 
6% say they have little or no autonomy, while 86% view their work to be valuable to 
society in ways that transcend its economic impact. As one respondent puts it, the 
“Press is important in a functioning democracy – digital journalism in particular, as it 
breaks down barriers for people who won't wade through a wall of text on a paper.” 
 In broad brush terms, the survey reveals what may appear to be somewhat 
contradictory perspectives. On the one hand, most journalistic workers are dissatisfied 
with their incomes and the precariousness of their careers. On the other, they 
appreciate their craft, its contributions to society, and the autonomy they report 
experiencing. With these findings in mind, a diversity of views appear to be at hand. 
As one respondent summarized his/her career: “Great opportunities, low pay,”   
 Arguably, such dichotomous interpretations of the state of journalistic labour 
are even more apparent when reading comments in response to the survey request, 
Briefly describe the effect digital technology has had on your work and workload. 
Here is a small sample of the answers: 
 “It has completely changed the nature of every element of what I do.” 
 “Digital technology puts a constant deadline on the shoulders of journalists, 
meaning more stories need to be done and faster.” 
 “It's added to my job, but made me more productive. But has downgraded 
society's belief that they should pay for information.” 
 “It's been great. It makes me more mobile, faster, better researched, and more 
effective.” 
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 “Digital technology has cheapened the craft of journalism. Everyone is a 
writer; therefore nobody feels it necessary to pay money for writers.” 
 “Increased workload. Decreased quality of journalism. Cut down on time to 
verify sources and think before you write.” 
 Despite obvious differences, these and many other comments regarding digital 
ICTs share an implicit or explicit understanding of technology as a force or some kind 
of agent in journalistic labour. As is commonplace in Canadian society (and many 
others, of course), things, including technologies, often are spoken about and treated 
as if they are inherently powerful. This is what Marx, in his assessment of the 
commodity, called a fetish. Importantly, both for Marx and for our purposes, to 
recognize the existence of fetishistic thinking is not to simplistically reference the 
presence of some form of delusion. Instead, the fetish – including the technological 
fetish that arguably is pervasive among contemporary journalists – is both the 
outcome and is itself constitutive of journalist-employer and journalist-
consumer/citizen relationships. To explain this and its significance, we turn to more 
theoretical concerns in the next section.    
Conceptualizing the fetish and technological fetishism 
When something is experienced as an 'in itself' instead of the outcome of social 
agency, it becomes a seemingly independent fact of life. This thinking stems from the 
very socialness of human reality; by our creation, organization, and use of the things 
and structures we construct. Once these mediate our lives they, prospectively, also 
shape existential realities. Reified technologies (or religious beliefs, social customs, 
etc.) thus come to be encountered and utilized as objective taken-for-granted 
facticities (Berger and Pullberg, 1965). 
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 Beyond this tendency, things, such as technologies, also can be invested with 
powers they do not possess inherently. As a technology or technique is registered and 
lived with – because it is used, thought of, and treated as if it is powerful – it in effect 
exercises power. Comprehending this condition is not reducible to some kind of 
real/unreal assessment. In Marx's concept commodity fetishism, for example, the 
notion that commodities have autonomous powers is not treated as some kind of 
twisted condition of the mind. Instead, it is an experiential outcome of social life 
itself. Not only, according to Marx, does “the social character of men's labour” appear 
to have “an objective character[,...] the relation of the producers to the sum total of 
their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between 
themselves, but between the products of their labour” (Marx, 1977: 77). Marx is 
arguing that it is “a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, 
the fantastic form of a relation between things” (Marx, 1977: 321) (emphases added). 
[4] 
 Fetishization is more than just reification. The latter, to repeat, concerns the 
taken-for-grantedness of human creations and the erasure of a conscious history about 
them. With the fetish, however, a more complex reality is at play. Under capitalism, 
relations between people are relatively mediated while those between things are more 
direct. Marx argued that what such (material) relational conditions yield socially and 
conceptually cannot be dismissed as mere delusions. He was well aware, for example, 
that the ever-calculating utilitarian (indeed, “rational”) bourgeois individual in the 
nineteenth century recognized that money is not inherently powerful yet in his/her 
social activity such an individual conveyed (to others and him/herself) something very 
different. The individual is not, to put it directly, ignorant of the fact that money is a 
voucher entitling the holder to a share of the social product. Instead, as Slavoj Žižek 
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summarizes, through “your social reality, by means of your participation in social 
exchange, you bear witness to the uncanny fact that a commodity really appears to 
you as a magical object endowed with special powers” (Žižek, 1998). [5] In this 
sense, the fetish is something that, upon reflection, most know or have the capacity to 
know is false but, through the conditions of one's social relations, act as if it is true.  
 More generally, the conditions and relations necessary for fetishistic thinking 
are pervasive in predominantly capitalist political economies. This association should 
be kept in mind as it enables us to fully comprehend how and why journalists, their 
employers, state officials and others represent and conceptualize digital ICTs as they 
do. In recent decades, in keeping with neoliberal economic policies, powerful 
corporate interests have developed and implemented these technologies to achieve 
various ends, most focusing on increasing labour efficiencies, reducing costs, and 
expanding or accelerating consumption. Indeed, the past decade has seen enormous 
upheaval and change in newsrooms across North America with tens of thousands of 
journalists losing their jobs. Precarity is on the rise while journalistic labour is 
rationalized, in part, through the introduction of ICTs (Compton and Benedetti, 2010). 
Rather than reductively or instrumentally reflecting the interests of dominant 
corporations, however, we argue that through resistance and degrees of organized 
political consciousness, the technological fetish discerned in the survey's responses 
reflects or, more accurately, refracts the more general fetishistic thinking that 
pervades capitalist societies and, more pointedly, 'common sense' interpretations of 
individual and collective experiences. [6]   
 Although the power of ICTs has been abstracted into something that is 
somehow an autonomous (and even magical) force, this is not to deny that the 
technological changes that have become so very integrated into daily life are not all 
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too real. Revisting Habermas’s (1970) technology as ideology thesis, Eran Fisher 
(2007) argues that: 
The strength of ideologies comes not from them being a veil on reality but a 
particular uncovering thereof. Vis-à-vis neoliberal theory, in the context of a 
technologically-saturated society, where more and more of social life is 
weaved into information technology, the digital discourse, as an ideology of 
technology, is all the more 'truer', making itself all the more ready for 
affirmation by technological reality; a 'self-evident truth'. (Fisher, 2007: para. 
51) 
Indeed, we argue that the power of the fetish lies in the fact that digital technologies 
have become constitutive features in the moment-to-moment labour of the journalist 
and his/her interactions with others. The individual, whether a full-time, part-time or 
freelance labourer, working primarily as a news reporter, feature writer, social media 
blogger, editor, or something else, increasingly acts and thinks – independently and in 
relation to others – through such technologies. “Reporting has become internet 
based,” states one survey respondent, “with the majority of source contact coming 
electronically.” According to another, reflecting on his/her constant connection to 
others through digital media, “God help us when the next major platform becomes a 
'must-do' – our brains may implode.” And yet another says that because of ICTs “I am 
never 'off the clock'.” 
 Let us quote one more who puts it as follows: “Digital technology doesn't 
affect my work -- it is my work.” 
 Again, while these statements reflect the inarguably concrete role played by 
digital technologies in contemporary journalism, the powers attributed to ICTs are not 
just straightforward reflections of material relations. They are, more precisely, 
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refractions. By using this word, conceptually we are able to recognize both the 
relative autonomy of human agency (i.e. the thinking capabilities of the journalistic 
worker) and the magical qualities of the fetish. As we develop below, a number of 
respondents to the survey's questions demonstrate an implicit awareness of this 
complexity. 
 Our point that digital ICTs do not inherently possess the capabilities prescribed 
to them but that these powers exist because others relate to one another as if they do 
can be clarified through what Gramsci called common sense (Gramsci, 1971: 332–5, 
419-25). Common sense is a way of thinking that, despite its empirical and logical 
shortcomings, serves as a shared and often useful guide in people's lives. As with the 
fetish, this usefulness involves the fact that others also act as if it makes sense. 
Gramsci contrasts common sense to what he calls good sense which, instead, entails a 
conscious understanding of the complexities, dualisms, and even the fetishisms that 
pervade everyday life. [7]  
 “Money can't buy you happiness” is useful common sense but, when applying 
good sense, it is questionable as layers of ideological baggage are revealed and 
complex structural conditions and inequalities become discernible. Similarly, as 
almost every journalist knows, the 'freedoms' and 'opportunities' associated with ICTs 
make sense but, when asked to exercise good sense on the matter, most (as some 
survey responses indicate) recognize their dependency on digital technology and that 
the freedoms and efficiencies at hand are largely outcomes of the impracticality of 
doing and retaining their jobs without them (Davis, 2013: 7-18). For one respondent, 
ICTs have enabled him/her to be “more flexible, creative and faster.” Another says, 
however, that “Without digital technology, I would have no job.” 
 The fetish, as a materially-based relational development, cannot be eradicated 
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through critical reflection alone (as with the application of good sense). Instead, it 
constitutes what Žižek refers to as an “objective illusion” (Žižek, 2006: 340). Rather 
than the predominance of some form of false thinking (for example, assuming that 
new technologies are themselves compelling journalism to change), the more pressing 
puzzle stems from people recognizing the falsity of such claims yet acting as if they 
are true. (Žižek 2006; Sloterdijk, 1987: 20). 
 Journalistic workers in Canada live and work in what is, of course, a 
predominantly capitalist society and, more directly, in the context of capitalist profit-
motives, this implies the predominance of relations among and mediated through 
things (for Marx, “commodity forms”). Fundamental to these relations are businesses 
and other interests that are systemically driven to implement more efficient ways to 
produce, distribute, and sell commodities, while people are compelled to develop and 
sell their labouring capabilities for a wage. For both the capitalist and worker (or most 
employers and employees) this entails ways of living, relating, and thinking that are 
atomizing: social relations that tend to be individualistic, competitive, and explicitly 
or implicitly dominated by exchange values. In these general conditions, the fetish 
constitutes a lived and ideational expression of everyday 'thingified' relations. The 
possession of things – including the commodified capacity to labour (what Marx 
called “labour power”) – becomes a condition for (and directly influences) the nature 
of one's participation (Burris, 1988: 6). As such, mediating things, including 
technologies, have no independent existence: they reflect and refract various other 
social forms (e.g. structured political economic interests, ideologies, professional 
ideals, etc.). According to John Michael Roberts, while “much of the activity of 
everyday life operates beyond the immediate confines of the capitalist mode of 
production ... [this mediated life is] enmeshed within the confines of capitalist social 
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relations wherein a diverse array of social forms permeate one another” (Roberts, 
2002: 100). 
 Everyday relations and thoughts thus take place through the mediation of life 
through things and, today, a seemingly endless number of relations are mediated 
through technological means. As Val Burris puts it, social arrangements “once visibly 
the product of human agency now appear as technological imperatives... As 
technology acquires a particular social form, human behavior is made to 'personify' 
(i.e. accommodate itself to) patterns of social organization compatible with the 
accumulated mass of technology” (Burris, 1988: 16). This approach, Burris insists, 
avoids an instrumentalist conceptualization of ideology; one in which structured ideas 
are simply the direct products of some kind of imposed manipulation (10). Such a 
conceptualization “presupposes a degree of unity and class consciousness among the 
ruling class that is empirically questionable”; “it fails to explain why particular forms 
of ideological mystification occur rather than others”; it represents “ideologies as 
simple rationalizations of [self-conscious and freely created] ruling-class interests”; 
and it tends to treat members subordinate classes as “passive objects of manipulation” 
(11). By foregrounding reification generally and the fetish specifically, Burris follows 
Marx in countering these problems – problems that emerge when inter-subjective 
realities are assessed primarily as the outcomes of deliberate actions and manipulated 
beliefs. 
Readers familiar with technological determinism – technologies and 
techniques as aloof yet decisive social agents (Webster, 1995: 39) – and, more 
particularly, critiques of it, will recognize this instrumentalism. While, for 
determinists, “technology will ultimately impose its own discipline and its own 
patterns over and above the efforts of specific agents…”, critics, such as Raymond 
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Williams, emphasize the social contexts and powerful interests that tend to dominate a 
technology’s development and implementation (Freedman, 2002: 427). And while, for 
Williams, technology has a “complex and variable connection with other social 
relations and institutions” (quoted in Freedman, 2002: 429), he argues that the 
seeming inevitability of a technology is “a product of the overt and covert marketing 
of the relevant interests” (Williams, 1985: 133). While we have no fundamental 
argument with this approach, our emphasis on technological fetishism allows us to go 
further in that its application transcends instrumentalist tendencies. By focusing on 
fetishism rather than determinism, more than the socialness and, thus, power 
implications of technologies and techniques are fleshed out in that the constitutive 
implications of technologies and techniques can be directly integrated into our 
analyses. As such, a direct awareness of the fetish enables us to escape a dichotomy in 
which material relations are prioritized over a somehow secondary ideational level. In 
sum, the fetish enables us to recognize that the technologies mediating social relations 
are deeply institutionally constitutive of capitalist relations both in toto and in the 
context of a particular place and time, such as Canada in the early twenty-first 
century. 
Relating technological fetishism to the survey 
The views garnered through our survey regarding the impact digital technologies are 
having on journalistic labour are varied. A relatively small number of respondents 
express enthusiasm, another minority have disdain for them, while most say they are 
both helpful and harmful. This mix entails one commonality, however: they involve 
some form of fetishistic thinking. Most commonly we see this in the view that ICTs 
somehow are acting on journalists and compelling employers to change their 
practices. “I work almost entirely in digital technology,” writes one respondent, “it 
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increases workload immensely but seems to be the way forward.” Another expresses a 
similar perspective but in a way that makes his/her sense of engulfment more explicit: 
“At present the technology threatens to disintegrate many jobs in the graphic design 
area of journalism. Instead of the technology being a tool to help people, it now seems 
to be destroying people's livelihoods.” Yet another expresses a similar viewpoint, 
emphasizing the power of technology to the exclusion of the economic interests and 
political decisions underlying its development and use: 
 “It [digital technology] has added significantly to my workload. I'm still 
expected to complete  the same amount of stories, but the work for each one has easily 
tripled. Instead of just writing an article, I now have to shoot video, take photos, come 
up with something for social media and try to add some kind of interactive online 
feature. There is no time.” 
 These and many other respondents also convey the common sense perspective 
that contemporary changes to journalism are unstoppable. There is, of course, a 
concreteness to this view as fetishistic thinking is experienced in terms of the worker's 
very real alienation and insecurity. Common sense notions that, to quote one 
respondent, “There is more to do, but more tools to do it with”, are popular perhaps 
because they constitute means of coping and/or making sense of a seemingly non-
sensical or uncontrollable predicament. 
 A final theme that is discernible at least in the comments of a significant 
minority expresses both technological fetishism and this common sense in terms of 
what might be called the myth of entrepreneurial journalism. Briefly, this is a much 
circulated notion that digital technologies and the related transformation of journalism 
are liberating and perhaps even democratizing both for journalists and polities. Rather 
than news and other information services being dominated by a small number of 
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corporate entities, some laud the coming of more entrepreneurial forms of journalism, 
seeing these as a means of freeing journalists from formerly restrictive institutional 
practices and career possibilities. Celebratory comments in this vein in our survey are, 
to repeat, in the minority but constitute a significant and ascendant perspective. They 
include the following: 
 “I am incredibly grateful for social media outlets, especially Twitter, for giving 
me a platform to share and promote my work. As a young journalist, I don't know a 
better way to promote myself while also hearing feedback and ideas from a growing 
audience. In turn, editors recognize I have an audience, and I've been told recently by 
one editor that they want my ideas because they want a younger audience. I'm also 
grateful for my second-hand iPhone, which allows me to live-tweet and take notes and 
photos on the fly. It has made my job easier and faster.” 
 Another respondent writes that “[w]ithout it [digital technology] I wouldn't 
have become a journalist. It means I can find out where interview subjects will be and 
when, so the whole of the English speaking world is a potential place to place pieces.” 
Embracing the promotional notion that ICTs not only create more opportunities but 
they also provide journalists with the means of attaining the market ideal of efficiency 
is this text messaging-like remark: “Provided new opportunities. Enormous time 
savings. (No more lining up at libraries!)” 
 “My bosses,” says another, “have deluded themselves into thinking they put 
digital first – they don't. Most decisions put print first and they’ve tied our ability to 
be nimble to the print front-end publishing system.” In other words, if only the 
employer more forcefully compelled journalists to 'go digital' the company he/she is 
working for would do better by enabling them to be more “nimble.”  
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Echoing this entrepreneurial zeal is one more who states that, quite simply, 
digital technologies yield “More jobs (++)”. 
 We hypothesize that many of these respondents are, relatively speaking, young 
or inexperienced journalistic workers whose job security is limited. We also think they 
might be (again relatively) more 'at home' with new technologies than their colleagues 
given that they have likely used digital ICTs all their working lives and intimately 
associate them with their jobs. But if this is generally correct we are left with what 
appears to be an exception to our earlier explication of the fetish as something people 
(at least when pushed to think about it) know is false yet act as if it is true. Is this 
minority – echoing promotional literature about a new 'golden age of journalism' – an 
example of the insightful perspectives of a marginalized group or is it, more 
astonishingly, a reflection (not a reflexion) of the fetish itself as a medium of 
delusional thinking (to repeat, something that Marx argued was far too simplistic)? 
We think it is neither. 
 Following G.A. Cohen's analysis of Marx concerning what he calls “the 
dialectic of labour,” (Cohen, 1988: 187-195) the tangible freedom experienced 
through the use of technology is not one free of constraints. The structural limits 
facing journalism in an increasingly efficiency-focused, multi-tasking, and tenuous 
occupation are critiqued by all but these more celebratory respondents. Here we have 
a glimpse of the contradictions experienced by journalists working in intensive 
digitally-mediated newsrooms. Digital technologies do open up creative possibilities 
for reporters and editors. Indeed, many of the journalism trade journals run features 
and commentaries on the potential to democratize the forms of storytelling that new 
media technologies make possible, including the participation of so-called citizen 
journalists. Again, these potentialities are not mere delusions; they are – seen 
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dialectically – utopian possibilities that are often negated by the dominant political 
economy of corporate convergence, labour rationalization and the short-term interests 
and demands of finance capital (Baker, 2007; Skinner et al., 2005; Winseck 2010). As 
Debra Clarke correctly notes, alongside the “digital ‘ultra-optimism’” of media 
managers “there has sometimes been a regrettable tendency … to dwell upon 
digitization and the digital technology itself to the relative neglect of the underlying 
economic conditions and wider social structures into which the technology has been 
inserted” (Clarke, 2014: 97-98).       
 In this political and economic context, it is quite possible that a worker can 
recognize his/her dependency on technology while not fully comprehending its role as 
a barrier (a barrier, for example, to one realizing some kind of job security or having 
the time to fully assess information and sources before filing a report). To use an 
analogy, someone might clearly see a closed door but, thinking he/she is free to come 
and go, remains unaware that it is locked. The point to be made here is that in order 
for the engulfing mechanisms of the fetish to be removed, the worker must at least 
understand the material nature of their contradictory situation – a situation we 
elaborate further below. 
Organization, political capacity, and the fetish 
The role played by technological fetishism is further understood by reading responses 
to the survey's questions concerning union representation. Several tensions are found 
in these answers. One that is important in the context of this paper involves a general 
division between the views of what we assume are newer/younger journalists in 
relation to their more experienced colleagues. For many of the former, unions are 
described as exclusionary and protective of more established workers, and we know 
from the survey that older journalists tend to be more unionized (or members of some 
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other collective organization). The survey also reveals that non-unionized workers are 
less likely to be paid for all their labour: more than half (51.9%) report that they are 
not paid for all their working hours while those who are unionized say that they are 
more likely to be fully remunerated (this situation among the non-unionized, we 
speculate, is due to their relatively tenuous status and their integration into work 
through mostly continuous and untethered digital connections). Despite these 
conditions, some of these respondents (among others) blame unions for slowing or 
retarding their employers' adoption of technology (which they mostly rate as a 
necessary advance) while others (most of whom we believe to be more experienced 
and secure workers) see unions as a means of buffering some of their negative 
implications such as being over worked and the threat of job losses. 
 We suggest that the technological fetish is mediating these different views. 
While fetishistic thinking is pervasive in capitalist political economies, we postulate 
that the extent to which digital ICTs have been, constitutively, the tools of one's 
everyday labour, the journalist's understanding of his/her craft and professional 
capabilities are embedded through their use. Newer journalists, we assume, have used 
an array of digital technologies all of their working lives while the more senior may 
not have this background (at least not in terms of the depth and breadth of their 
everyday application). To repeat, more experienced journalists are more likely to be 
unionized and hold more secure positions. These two conditions, in some instances, 
may structurally and conceptually help them to be relatively detached from (rather 
than engulfed in) what has become a norm for most: the full integration of ICTs into 
their labour and thus their dependency on utilizing such technologies to do, find, and 
retain work. [8]  
 To further investigate this seemingly odd embrace of technologies especially 
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among some of the less experienced and unorganized journalistic workers – 
technologies being used to facilitate the very insecurities and inequalities that appear 
to be at the core source of tensions and divisions among journalists – we now turn to 
comments made in response to survey questions concerning unions. 
 “The union,” states one respondent, “seems more interested in protecting 
pensions and senior workers who don't contribute much. Their actions prevent the 
hiring of younger journalists with much-needed digital skills.” According to another, 
“If it wasn't for the union protecting jobs in bloated corporate departments and 
stomping their feet over short-term contracts, I would likely be employed right now.” 
To quote a similar perspective: “Unions are resistant to changes in job roles that we 
need to make in order to keep up with digital transformation.” Others, however, 
recognize the potential worth of unions – one stating that “It's good to have union 
protection for this industry these days”, while another perceives them to not care 
“about work conditions like tasks definition, workload [sic] and never tries to stop 
multitasking.” 
 In other comments, respondents share their experiences and perceptions of 
digital technology as an indispensable and, indeed, powerful force. In fact, this 
objective illusion appears to be mediating how some conceptualize the implications of 
organized labour itself. “I think a union would impose too much structure on a 
profession that requires flexibility,” remarks one, who continues that “Unions are 
resistant to changes in job roles that we need to make in order to keep up with digital 
transformation.” Another writes that while “[i]t's great to have support and advocacy 
for things like wages, overtime and security ... [unions] can also lead to some 
workforce inertia where things don't evolve, and that can limit opportunities.” One 
respondent who seems to be expressing what might well be a refracted assessment of 
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new technologies states that “[i]n an industry that is under siege, union membership at 
least allows the illusion of having some control over my work environment and 
conditions.” 
 The fetish, to reiterate, stems from very real 'thingified' relations but is not 
simplistically determined by such conditions. Instead, the power of a thing is accepted 
largely because it is acted upon by others. Money, for example, really does have 
power – not inherently but, rather, in a society in which people use it to express, 
exercise, or resist power. Similarly, digital technologies, even though they are just 
things, are developed and used to empower some over others and to enable workers to 
do powerful things for themselves and others. Journalistic workers, especially those 
who use them or are dependent on them in ways that are deeply constitutive, thus are 
not 'wrong' in recognizing the power of technology. Nevertheless, as we have 
suggested, this power has disempowering implications in terms of the technology's 
direct mediation and thus obfuscation of engulfing conditions and dependency 
relationships – conditions and relationships within still more complex political 
economic relations (and, in the terms of common sense norms, sometimes 
contradictory ways of thinking and acting). However, it is important to point out that a 
small number of respondents to the survey demonstrate some keen insights that 
reveal, we think, at least a fragmentary recognition that the predominant common 
sense may not be good sense. Some comments, like the following, while peppered 
with industry jargon, show some amount of awareness regarding the relationship 
between economic forces and assumed technological capabilities: 
 “The workload has more than doubled, without a corresponding increase in 
salary, staffing or revenue for the company. Ad agencies do not know how to connect 
with the clients of their clients, so they are pushing a digital agenda that we need to 
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buy into in order to secure revenue... Younger buyers push digital without concern for 
whether it will reach the desired audience... It is not unusual to generate a quarter (or 
less) revenue from a digital property that takes the same amount of work as a 
traditional media project. This is part of the reason most print publishers have simply 
pushed responsibilities for digital projects (website, blogging, social media) onto 
existing print staff, and that is stretching the staffing levels dangerously thin, and 
weakening the deliverables considerably.” 
 Other respondents similarly recognize that the economic and technological 
developments at hand are having deleterious implications for the quality of what is 
produced: 
 “Publishers want copy for the web but pay very little for it. They also want it 
more quickly than copy for traditional print. There seems to be little to no concern 
about quality or fact checking.” 
 “The ability for everyone to self-publish has devalued the written word and 
make media employers feel justified in paying next to nothing.” 
 “I am often expected to tweet and send copy to the web during the news event 
I am covering. This distracts me from the event that I am covering and makes it more 
difficult to analyze the event and ask effective questions.” 
 “It [digital technology] has increased the stress level, workload, you name it. 
Everything must be tweeted as information is available, sitting down and writing a 
coherent, well-thought out story seems an afterthought.” 
 Others are even more explicit in expressing a sense of powerlessness while 
also understanding the profit motives underlying technology's rapid deployment: 
 “[Digital technology has d]ramatically increased my workload and 
expectations of me... no real room for intelligence given constant demand to feed the 
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goat...” 
 “The fact is the more one can produce the more you must produce.” 
 These and, we argue, most other journalistic workers, have some awareness of 
the political economic interests and dynamics behind the radical changes underway 
yet there is also a palatable sense of resignation, acceptance, or celebratory 
enthusiasm which we take to be varied expressions of the technological fetish in 
action.   
Conclusions 
The struggle starts from where we are and what we are; the struggle is 
a refusal of where we are and what we are: we are in-and-against, 
against-and-in. But more than that: in order to be sustained, the 
struggle in-and-against must become a moving against-and-beyond...  
-- John Holloway (2005: 39). 
Given the precarious nature of contemporary journalism and in light of what our 
survey suggests is the now deeply contradictory experience of journalistic labour and 
potentially unsustainable nature of the craft/profession, other ways of structuring 
journalistic labour and the institution of journalism are urgently needed (Compton and 
Benedetti 2015; McChesney and Nichols 2010). Furthermore, given the relative 
security and economic resources of the unionized journalist, our findings suggest that 
this alternative structure might well involve some focus on the widening and 
deepening of Canadian journalists as an organized workforce. Beyond this general 
point is the complex of relationships referenced in this paper involving digital 
technologies, political economic dynamics, and vested interests. We have suggested 
that the technological fetish is playing a significant but under assessed role, 
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particularly in how different journalists (influenced by their experiences, job security, 
and organizational status) perceive their work in light of technological change. 
 Digital technologies, we have argued, are constitutive of journalistic practices 
and, indeed, the political capacities of journalistic workers. The common sense that 
journalism 'must change with the times' is variously challenged by different (i.e. 
relatively autonomous) journalists whose capacities to exercise good sense involves a 
number of material conditions and structured capabilities.  
 We have also argued that despite the secondary status of good sense thinking, 
through its development the fetish itself is at least conceptually penetrable. For all 
involved, however, we conclude with the general observation that journalistic workers 
are experiencing (and in our survey have articulated) a sense of empowerment 
through their use of digital technologies yet this has been accompanied by a less 
discernible form of disempowerment. For some, this state of affairs – what might be 
termed an engulfed freedom [9] – is not readily perceived while, for others, this 
engulfment is recognized but seen to be largely inescapable. 
 As Marx understood, a person can only be suitably independent and free of 
such engulfments after the constitutive media and relations of this condition are 
recognized and structurally reformed or removed. The puzzle as to why journalistic 
workers continue to act on something they know to be false is now comprehensible as 
the technological fetish is rooted in relational conditions and everyday practices and it 
is here, and not just not just in the mind, that political action is required. 
 
  
23 
 
Endnotes 
[1] “Engulfment” refers to a condition of unrecognized constraint. Someone who is 
aware of being in some way constrained has the capacity to at least conceptualize 
what stands in the way of her freedom, while the individual who cannot recognize the 
relationship or condition or structure as such is engulfed by it. A simple analogy is 
that of the child engulfed by his parents: as G.A. Cohen puts it, “he knows them to be 
separate from him, yet does not know himself to be separate from them” (Cohen, 
1988: 188). 
[2] No self-identifying information was collected. The completion rate was 77%. An 
initial report on the survey was presented in the following year. See Nicole Cohen, 
Edward Comor and James R. Compton, et al. (2014) Journalistic Labour and Digital 
Transformation: A Survey of Working Conditions. Paper presented at the Canadian 
Association of Work and Labour Studies conference, Brock University, 29-30 May. 
[3] Journalist incomes, on the whole, are similar to some comparable occupations, as 
the median wage is in the $40-60,000 range. In recent years, however, these wages 
generally have declined in relation to inflation. By factoring in the rate of inflation 
between 2008-2012 (when prices in Canada rose 6.64%), 56.3% of respondents 
experienced a significant reduction of their real incomes. Almost 43% depend on the 
income of a spouse, 13.7% of respondents depend on credit cards, and 11.2% state 
that they depend on bank loans or lines of credit. 
[4] According to Georg Lukács, reified capitalist relations undermine the 
bourgeoisie’s ability to fully comprehend its own structural conditions. For the 
working class, however, its much different relationship to capital entails at least the 
potential to profoundly understand such conditions. For him, thought is both cognitive 
and creative; i.e. it does not simplistically reflect a concrete reality but, instead, 
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knowledge is the outcome of one’s active engagement with it. Indeed, reification, as a 
structural outcome of Marx’s more general commodity form, is seen to be nothing less 
than “the central structural problem of capitalist society…” (Lukács 1971, p. 83).  
[5] In accordance with this dual reality, Marx also argued that workers, especially 
when experiencing a state of immiseration, collectively could recognize the 
constructed nature of their situations and thus their political capabilities in relation to 
capital. See, for example, Marx and Engels (1979). 
[6] In arguing that the technological fetish refracts more general fetishistic and 
common sense thinking, we allude to notions of causality that are more complex and 
mediated than reductive or instrumentalist. Rather than arguing that the technological 
fetish is generally a direct reflection or mirroring of broader reified and fetishized 
conditions, we recognize that different and complex levels of causality are at work 
and each (while inter-related) involve degrees of relatively autonomous action. In 
turn, technological fetishism constitutes what might be termed a mediating 
abstraction: mediating what often constitute refracted interactions and 
conceptualizations. For an elaborating this methodological approach, see Roberts 
(2013). 
[7] Common sense also reflects a form of knowledge attained through crude forms of 
empiricism or shared sensations, while good sense consciously (and ‘scientifically’) 
conceptualizes another form of knowledge that is both conditioned and open to 
reflexive analyses. Rather than reflecting some kind of false/true dichotomy, for 
Gramsci this common sense/good sense formulation constituted, in part, a 
pedagogical device crafted to impel reflexive thinking. “Philosophy,” as Gramsci put 
it, “is criticism and the superseding of religion and 'common sense'. In this sense it 
coincides with 'good sense' as opposed to 'common sense'” (Gramsci, 1971: 326). 
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[8] In the survey, journalists who are not unionized report higher levels of job 
insecurity. A statistical analysis reveals a strong positive relationship (significant at 
the .001 level) between respondents who are not represented by a union and those 
earning an inadequate income. Unionized journalists – constituting 43.1% of 
respondents – are more likely to earn higher incomes and report these to be adequate. 
[9] By “freedom” we include a person's freedom to sell his/her labour power to 
anyone who contracts it. 
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